Abstract-This work investigates the fundamental constraints of anonymous communication (AC) protocols. We analyze the relationship between bandwidth overhead, latency overhead, and sender anonymity or recipient anonymity against the global passive (network-level) adversary. We confirm the trilemma that an AC protocol can only achieve two out of the following three properties: strong anonymity (i.e., anonymity up to a negligible chance), low bandwidth overhead, and low latency overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
Millions of users from all over the world employ anonymous communication networks, such as Tor [1] , to protect their privacy over the Internet. The design choice made by the Tor network to keep the latency and bandwidth overheads small has made it highly attractive to its geographically diverse user-base. However, over the last decade, the academic literature [2] - [8] has demonstrated Tor's vulnerability to a variety of traffic correlation attacks. In fact, Tor also has been successfully attacked in practice [9] .
It is widely accepted that low-latency low-bandwidth overhead of anonymous communication (AC) protocols, such as Tor [10] , can only provide a weak form of anonymity [11] . In the anonymity literature, several AC protocols were able to overcome this security barrier to provide a stronger anonymity guarantee (cryptographic indistinguishability based anonymity [12] , [13] ) by either increasing the latency overhead or the bandwidth overhead. In particular, high-latency approaches (such as threshold mix networks [14] ) can ensure strong anonymity by introducing significant communication delays for users messages, while high-bandwidth approaches (such as Dining Cryptographers network [15] and its extensions [16] - [18] ) can provide strong anonymity by adding copious noise (or dummy) messages.
There have been a few efforts to propose hybrid approaches [19] - [24] that try to provide anonymity by simultaneously introducing latency and bandwidth overhead. However, it is not clear how to balance such system parameters to ensure strong anonymity while preserving practical performance.
In general, in the last 35 years a significant amount of research efforts have been put towards constructing novel AC protocols, deploying them, and attacking real-world AC networks. However, unlike other security fields such as cryptography, our understanding regarding the fundamental limits and requirements of AC protocols remains limited. This work takes some important steps towards answering fundamental question associated with anonymous communication. "Can we prove that strong anonymity cannot be achieved without introducing large latency or bandwidth overhead? When we wish to introduce the latency and bandwidth overheads simultaneously, do we know the overhead range values that still fall short at providing stronger anonymity?" Our Contribution. We confirm a previously conjectured [24] , [25] relationship between bandwidth overhead, latency overhead and anonymity. We find that there are fundamental bounds on sender and recipient anonymity properties [12] , [13] , [26] , [27] of a protocol that directly depend on the introduced bandwidth and latency overheads.
This work presents a generic model of AC protocols using petri nets [28] , [29] such that different instantiations of this model will represent different AC protocols, covering most practical AC systems in the literature. We derive upper bounds on anonymity as functions of bandwidth overhead and latency overhead, against two prominent adversary classes: global passive network-level adversaries and strictly stronger adversaries that additionally (passively) compromise some protocol parties (e.g., relays in case of Tor). These bounds constitute necessary constraints for anonymity. Naturally, the constraints are valid against any stronger adversary class as well.
For both adversary classes, we analyze two different user distributions (i.e., distributions that determine at which time or rate users of the AC protocol send messages): (i) synchronized user distributions, where users globally synchronize their messages, and (ii) unsynchronized user distributions, where each user locally decides when to send his messages independent of other users.
We analyze the trade-off between latency overhead and bandwidth overhead required to achieve strong anonymity, i.e., anonymity up to a negligible (in a security parameter η) chance of failure. For any AC protocol where only a fraction of β ∈ [0, 1] users send noise messages per communication round, and where messages can only remain in the network for ≥ 0 communication rounds, we find that against a global network-level adversary no protocol can achieve strong anonymity if 2β < 1 − 1/poly(η) even when all the protocol parties are honest. In the case where a strictly stronger adversary additionally passively compromises c (out of K) protocol parties, we show that strong anonymity is impossible if 2( − c)β < 1 − 1/poly(η) (for c < ), or 2β < 1 − 1/poly(η) and ∈ O(1) (for c ≥ ).
We also assess the practical impact of our results by analyzing prominent AC protocols. Our impossibility results naturally only offer necessary constraints for anonymity, but not sufficient conditions for the AC protocol. However, these necessary constraints for sender and recipient anonymity are crucial for understanding bi-directional anonymous communication. In fact, we find that several AC protocols in the literature are asymptotically close to the suggested constraints. Moreover, designers of new AC protocols can use our necessary constraints as guidelines for avoiding bad trade-off between latency and bandwidth-overhead.
II. OVERVIEW

A. Formalization and Adversary Model
AC Protocols as Petri Nets. We define a view of AC protocols as petri nets [28] - [30] , i.e., as graphs with two types of labeled nodes: places, that store colored tokens, and transitions, that define how these tokens are sent over the graph. In our case, each colored token represents a message, places are the protocol parties that can receive, hold and send messages, and transitions describe how parties exchange and relay messages. Our model captures all AC protocols under the assumption that messages are transmitted directly, i.e., in order for Bob to receive a message from Alice, Alice has to send the message and the message (albeit relayed, delayed and cryptographically modified) eventually has to reach Bob. While this requirement may sound strict, as elaborated in Section IV-B, we effectively only exclude few esoteric protocols. User Distributions, Communication Rounds, Bandwidth Overhead, and Latency. We consider two types of user distributions. In the first user distribution (synchronized) N users send their messages in exactly N rounds (see Figure 1 for notations). Per round, exactly one user sends a message. The protocol decides which users send noise messages in each round. In the second user distribution (unsynchronized) each user independently decides whether to send a message in a round using a coin flip, with a success probability p.
The model considers synchronous communication rounds as in [16] , [17] , [31] , [32] . We model latency overhead as the number of rounds a message can be delayed by the protocol before being delivered. We formalize bandwidth overhead β as the number of noise messages per user that the protocol can create in every round, i.e., the dummy message rate.
Our two types of user distributions cover a large array of possible scenarios. Results for our user distributions imply Latency overhead for every message β Bandwidth overhead for every user per round p Probability to send a message per user per round K Number of (internal) protocol parties c Number of compromised protocol parties N Number of online users (that may send messages) δ Adversarial advantage in the anonymity game Π A protocol. Π ∈ M : Π is within our model η The security parameter A (very small, but non-negligible) function Adversaries. We consider global passive non-compromising adversaries, that can observe all communication between protocol parties; and strictly stronger partially compromising (passive) adversaries, that can compromise protocol parties to learn the mapping between inputs and outputs for this party. Anonymity Property. We leverage an indistinguishability based anonymity notion for sender anonymity: the adversary has to distinguish two senders of its own choosing [12] , [13] . For a security parameter η, we say that a protocol achieves strong anonymity, if the adversary's advantage remains negligible in η. Strong anonymity is relative to a strength η, which is bound to system parameters or analysis parameters such as the number of users or protocol parties, the latency overhead and the bandwidth overhead. These parameters typically increase as η increases, which improves the protocol's anonymity. 2 Anonymity in relation to η unifies a wide variety of possible analyses on how the anonymity bound changes with changing system parameters, and user numbers and behaviors.
B. Brief Overview of the Proof Technique
As non-compromising adversaries are a subset of partially compromising adversaries, our proof technique for the former is a simplified case of the latter. In general, we derive our results in four main steps.
First, we define a concrete adversary A paths , that uses a well established strategy: upon recognizing the challenge message (as soon as it reaches a receiver) A paths constructs the possible paths this message could have taken through the network, and tries to identify the user who has sent the message.
Second, given the concrete adversary A paths , we identify a necessary invariant that any protocol has to fulfill in order to provide anonymity. Intuitively: both challenge users chosen by the adversary must be active (i.e., send at least one message) before the challenge message reaches the recipient, and it must be possible for these messages to meet in at least one honest party along the way. We prove that indeed this natural invariant is necessary for anonymity.
Next, we propose an ideal protocol Π ideal that is optimal in terms of satisfying the invariant: The probability that Π ideal fulfills the necessary invariant is at least as high as for any protocol within our model (limited by the same constraints for β and ). Moreover, whenever Π ideal satisfies the invariant, the advantage of A paths is zero. Thus, Π ideal is at least as good as any protocol within our model at winning against A paths .
Finally, we calculate the advantage of A paths against Π ideal to obtain a lower bound on the adversarial advantage against all protocols within our model. 3 
C. Scenarios and Lower Bounds
We devise necessary constraints for four different scenarios. Let Π be a protocol in our model, with N users, restricted by bandwidth overhead β ∈ [0, 1] and latency overhead ≥ 0. For the compromising cases, the adversary can compromise c out of K protocol parties. We derive the following lower bounds for δ-sender anonymity in the respective scenarios.
Synchronized Users, Non-compromising Adversaries:
Synchronized Users, Partially Compromising Adversaries:
Unsynchronized Users, Non-compromising Adversaries:
Unsynchronized Users, Partially Compromising Adv.:
To keep the presentation concise, we focus on how to derive bounds for sender anonymity. As the bounds for recipient anonymity are obtained analogously, we only explain the adjustments in the proofs and the corresponding resulting bounds. The omitted canonical analysis can be found in [33] .
D. Interpretation and Interesting Cases
Our first and third lower bounds, for respectively synchronized and unsynchronized user behaviors against in a noncompromised AC network, suggest an anonymity trilemma. Both lower bounds can be simplified under some natural constraints to the following simplified lemma:
Lemma 1 (Informal Trilemma). For security parameter η, no protocol can achieve strong anonymity if 2 β < 1 − (η), where (η) = 1 η d for any positive constant d. 3 A paths is a possible adversary against all protocols within our model. If A paths has an advantage of δ against our ideal protocol Π ideal (bounded by β and ), then A paths will also have an advantage of at least δ against any protocol within our model (that is also bounded by β and ). Thus, our bound for δ describes a lower bound on the adversarial advantage against any protocol within the model, while against particular protocols there can be other adversaries (in the same adversary class) with an even higher advantage.
Ideal asymptotic values for latency overhead is = O(1) (i.e., a constant number of hop separation from the receiver), while ideal asymptotic values for bandwidth overhead is
, a constant number of message per round from all N = poly(η) users combined). It is easy to see that for this ideal overhead β = O(1/poly(η)), the trilemma excludes strong anonymity, while, with latency overhead = N = O(poly(η)) or with bandwidth overhead β = O(1), the trilemma does not exclude strong anonymity.
We find some interesting possible overhead constraints for strong anonymity (e.g. = O(η) and β = O(1/η)) demanding some compromise in both latency and bandwidth. These constraints can help understand and improve existing AC protocols as well as inform the design of future AC protocols.
For partially compromised scenarios the requirements are naturally stronger. All constraints discussed for compromised case in the following part are in addition to the requirements from the non-compromised case. While bandwidth overhead might be sufficient against non-compromising adversaries, it is not sufficient if parts of the protocol are compromised. With = η and K c = constant strong anonymity may be possible, whereas with = O(1), strong anonymity is impossible, even for K ∈ poly(η) and c = O (1) .
In case c < , strong anonymity guarantees may be possible only if 2( − c)p > 1 − (η), where p = p + β combines the genuine user messages p with their bandwidth overhead β. Our result shows a connection between the expected usage behavior p and the latency . If p is not particularly large, the latency cannot be low; otherwise, the path-length cannot be sufficiently high to ensure mixing at an honest node. In other words, unless p is very large (as should be the case for some file sharing applications), a low latency renders the AC protocol cheap to compromise, i.e., c can be low.
Our necessary constraints enable protocol designers of AC protocols to avoid bad trade-offs between latency and bandwidth overhead. For a given expected user behavior and a given target attacker against which the AC shall provide anonymity, our constraints clearly state which combinations of latency and bandwidth overhead to avoid.
E. Related Work
In contrast to previous work, our work provides necessary constraints for strong anonymity w.r.t. to bandwidth and latency overhead. While there is a successful line of work on provable anonymity guarantees [12] , [26] , [27] , [34] - [37] , it is incomparable since it provides lower bounds on anonymity for specific protocols, and does not prove any general statements about sufficient conditions for strong anonymity.
Previous work on attacks against anonymous communication protocols, except for Oya et al. [38] , solely provides upper bounds on anonymity for specific protocols [39] - [42] . Oya et al. [38] cast their attack in a general model and provide a sophisticated generic attacker. However, they only compute bounds w.r.t. a dummy message rate against timed pool mixes, not against other protocols and not w.r.t. latency and compromisation rate. Even more important, none of these results discuss the relationship of the lower bounds for latency and bandwidth overheads.
III. ANONYMITY DEFINITION AND USER DISTRIBUTIONS A. AnoA-Style Anonymity Definition
We define our anonymity notions with a challenge-response game similar to AnoA [26] , [27] , where the challenger simulates the protocol and the adversary tries to deanonymize users. The challenger Ch(Π, α, b) allows the adversary to adaptively control user communication in the network, up to an uncertainty of one bit for challenges, and is parametric in the following parts: (i) the AC protocol Π to be analyzed, (ii) the so called anonymity function α, that describes the specific variant of anonymity such as sender anonymity, recipient anonymity and relationship anonymity, (iii) and the challenge bit b which determines the decision the challenger takes in challenge inputs from the adversary.
Given a security parameter η, we quantify the anonymity provided by the protocol Π simulated by Ch(Π, α, b) in terms of the advantage the probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A has in correctly guessing Ch's challenge bit b. We measure this advantage in terms of indistinguishability of random variables additively, where the random variables in question represent the output of the interactions A|Ch(Π, α, 0) and A|Ch(Π, α, 1) .
4 for the security parameter η, an adversary class C, an anonymity function α and a distinguishing factor
For an anonymity function α, we say that a protocol Π provides strong anonymity [12] , [13] if it is (α, δ)−IND-ANO with δ ≤ neg(η) for some negligible function neg. If δ is instead non-negligible in η, then we say that Π provides weak anonymity. Note that η does not measure the size of the anonymity set, but the computational limitation of the adversary. Sender Anonymity. Sender anonymity characterizes the anonymity of users against a malicious server through the inability of the server (or some intermediary) to decide which of two self-chosen users have been communicating with the server. We borrow the sender anonymity α SA definition from the AnoA framework [26] , where α SA selects one of two possible challenge users and makes sure that the users cannot be distinguished based on the chosen recipient(s) or message(s). Recipient Anonymity. Recipient anonymity characterizes that the recipient of a communication remains anonymous, even to observers that have knowledge about the sender in 4 AnoA also allows a multiplicative factor ε; we use the simplified version with ε = 0, such that δ directly corresponds to the adversarial advantage.
if this is the first time, such a message is received then
Run Π on r = (u, R, m) and forward all messages that are sent by Π to the adversary A and send all messages by the adversary to Π. Fig. 2 . Adaptive AnoA Challenger [26] question. Similar to sender anonymity, we borrow the recipient anonymity α RA definition from the AnoA framework, where α RA selects one of two possible recipients for a message and makes sure that the recipients cannot be distinguished based on the chosen sender(s) or message(s). Figure 2 .
Definition 3 (Recipient anonymity).
We omit the detailed technical notation of the anonymity functions in the following sections, and write
B. Game Setup
Let S be the set of all senders, R be the set of all recipients, and P be the set of protocol parties that participate in the execution of the protocol (like relays/mix-nodes in Tor/mixnets, for DC-net or P2P mixing users and protocol parties are the same). We consider a system of total |S|= N senders. Given our focus on sender anonymity, we need only a single element in R. We allow the adversary to set the same entity (say R) as the recipient of all messages, and expect R to be compromised by the adversary. The adversary uses a challenge (as defined in Figure 2 ) of the form (u 0 , u 1 , R, , m 0 ), where u 0 , u 1 ∈ S, for our sender anonymity game.
We consider a completely connected topology, which means any party can send a message directly to any other party. We assume a standard (bounded) synchronous communication model as in [16] , [17] , [31] , [32] , where a protocol operates in a sequence of communication rounds. 5 In each round, a party performs some local computation, sends messages (if any) to other party through an authenticated link. By the end of the round, every party receives all messages sent by the other parties to her the same round. With our focus on computing lower bounds, our model abstracts from the time the computations at the node take and also the length of the messages. Nevertheless, as we are interested in quantifying the communication/bandwidth overhead, unlike [16] , [17] , [32] , we do not assume that the parties have access to ready-made broadcast communication channels; Parties are expected to communicate with each other to implement broadcast features [31] , [45] . Lastly, the use of the asynchronous communication model offers more capabilities to the attacker, and thus, our impossibility results for the synchronous model naturally apply to the asynchronous model as well.
We define the latency overhead as the number of rounds a message can be delayed by the protocol before being delivered. We define the bandwidth overhead β as the number of noise messages per user that the protocol can create in every round (i.e., the dummy message rate) and we do not restrict the time these noise messages reside within the protocol.
We consider two types of global passive adversaries: Our non-compromising adversaries (which model networklevel eavesdroppers) can observe all communication between all protocol parties, but do not compromise any party of the AC protocol except the recipient R. We say that the AC protocol is non-compromised. Our strictly stronger partially compromising adversaries (which model hacking and infiltration capabilities) can additionally compromise some of the AC parties in the setup phase of the game to obtain these parties' mapping between the input messages and output messages during the protocol's runtime. We say that the AC protocol is partially compromised.
C. User Distributions
We consider two kinds of user distributions in our anonymity games and both of them assume an N sized set S of users that want to send messages. In both cases, the adversary can choose any two senders u 0 , u 1 ∈ S. However, the time and method by which they actually send messages differs:
• In the synchronized user distribution the users globally synchronize who should send a message at which point in time. We assume that each user wants to send exactly one message. Consequently, we choose a random permutation of the set of users S and the users send messages in their respective round. In every single round out of a total of N rounds exactly one user sends a message. Since the users globally synchronize their sending of messages, we allow the protocol to also globally decide on the bandwidth overhead it introduces. Note that here the requirements are identical to those of the Bulk protocol in [17] .
• In the unsynchronized user distribution each of the N users wants to send messages eventually and we assume that each user locally flips a (biased) coin every round to decide whether or not to send a message. In this case we define the bandwidth overhead as an increased chance of users sending messages. Since the protocol does not globally synchronize the input messages, for noise messages also we allow the users to decide it locally and send noise messages with a certain probability.
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IV. A PROTOCOL MODEL FOR AC PROTOCOLS
An AC protocol allows any user in the set of users S to send messages to any user in R, via a set of anonymizing parties P. We define protocols that are under observation of an eavesdropping adversary A that may have compromised a set of c parties P c ⊆ P and that furthermore observes the communication links between any two parties, including users.
Technically, whenever a party P 1 ∈ P ∪ S sends a message to another party P 2 ∈ P ∪ R, the adversary is able to observe this fact together with the current round number. However, we assume the protocol applies sufficient cryptography, s.t., the adversary can not read the content of any message except the messages sent to the malicious recipient, which technically results in simply being able to additionally recognize when the challenge reaches the recipient.
For an actual protocol, the sets S, R, and P might not be mutually exclusive [15] , [16] , [18] . Since we have only one malicious party in R, and the content of a message can only be read when it reaches its final recipient, we consider R to be mutually exclusive from S ∪ P for the purpose of simplicity.
With the above preliminaries in mind, we shall now formally define our generic AC protocol using a petri net model.
A. Protocol Model
We model any AC protocol with K parties by a timed colored petri net [28] - [30] M , consisting of places S for the users, P 1 , . . . , P K symbolizing the protocol parties, $1 for randomness and R for recipients of messages, and colored tokens m symbolizing the messages (real or noise) sent by clients or protocol parties, and transitions T S for inserting messages into the network and T P1 , . . . , T P K as functions for sending the messages from one party to another. The structure of the petri net with its places, tokens and transitions remains the same for every AC protocol. However, the implementation of the guards within the transitions is different for different protocols: protocols can choose to which party messages are to be sent next and whether they should be delayed. But, protocols in M are oblivious to the challenge message or the challenge users. We refer to Figure 3 for a graphical depiction of petri net model M . The four fields ID t , prev, next, ts are public, and are visible to the adversary. The remaining three fields msg, meta and t r in a token are private and can not be observed by the adversary, with the exception that msg can be observed when a message reaches its destination, i.e, is received by a recipient. Formally, we introduce a set Tokens, that is initially empty and in which we collect the pair (t, r), where t is a copy of a token and r the round number in which the token was observed. Places. Any AC protocol with K parties P = {P 1 , . . . , P K } consists of the following places:
Definition 4 (Colored token
• S: A token in S denotes a user message (real or noise) which is scheduled to enter the network after ts rounds.
• $1: This place is responsible for providing randomness. Whenever a transition picks a token from this place, the transition basically picks a random value.
• P i with P i ∈ P: A token in P i denotes a message which is currently held by the party P i ∈ P.
• R: A token in R denotes a message which has already been delivered to a recipient. Transitions. As part of the initial configuration, the challenger populates S on behalf of the protocol. All other places are initially empty. The transitions then consumes tokens from one place and generate tokens to other places, to modify the configuration of the petri-net. The event of consumption of a token from one place by a transition and generation of a new token represents the movement of a message from one party to another. We define the following transitions (refer to Figure 4 for the pseudocodes of the transitions):
• T S : takes a token msg, , , , u, , ts from S and a token from $1 to write t = msg, meta, , ID t , u, P i , ts = 1 to P i ; the values of i and meta are decided by the AC protocol.
• T Pi : takes a token msg, meta, t r , ID t , , P i , ts from P i and a token from $1 to write t = msg, meta , t r − 1, ID t , P i , P , 1 to P . If P i is an honest party ID t is freshly generated, but if P i is a compromised party ID t = ID t . The place P ∈ {P 1 , . . . , P K } ∪ {R} and meta are decided by the AC protocol, with the exception that if t r = 0, P always is R. In either case, the transition also adds an element (t , r) to the set Tokens, where r is the current round number and t is a copy of the respective (new) token t, with the fields meta and T S on tokens q = msg, , , , u, , ts from S and $ from $1:
A function provided by Π to determine routing and the meta field. . For every message that is sent from one party in S ∪ P to another party in P ∪ R, the adversary learns the time, the sender, and the receiver. When a message leaves the network, the attacker learns whether it was the target (i.e., the challenge) message. The attacker also learns the mapping between the input and output messages of compromised parties.
B. Expressing Protocols
Our protocol model M allows the expression of any AC protocol with very few, esoteric exceptions.
Mix networks can be naturally embedded into our model, in particular any stop-and-go mix [46] that uses discrete distribution and even AC protocols with specialized path selection algorithms [47] , [48] . For the sake of our necessary constraints, low-latency protocols (with time-bounded channels) that are not round-based (e.g., Tor [44] ) can be expressed in a roundbased variant, since it only strengthens the protocols anonymity properties. This section illustrates embedding techniques into our model for some other kinds of protocols, but a much larger variety of protocols can be expressed in our model. Users as protocol parties. In peer-to-peer protocols like dining cryptographers networks (DC net) [16] , [18] , there are no separate protocol parties, users act as a type of relays. Also, any noise sent by users counts into the bandwidth overhead of the protocol (we will see in Claim 2 that noise sent by nodes that are not users can be treated differently). Whenever a user wants to send a message it should use the transition T S , but when it acts as a relay it should use the transition T Pi . For interested readers, we show in Appendix A how to model a specific DC net type protocol using our petri net model. Splitting and Recombining Messages. We model protocols that split and later re-combine messages by declaring one of the parts as the main message and the other parts as noise, which may count into the bandwidth overhead. This declaration is mainly required for the analysis, i.e., for evaluating the success of the adversary and for quantifying the amount of noise messages introduced by the protocol. We do not restrict the strategy by which the protocol decides which message is "the main share" (i.e., the message that is sent on) and which is "an additional share" (i.e., a fresh noise message). A more complex scenario involves threshold schemes in which a smaller number of shares suffices for reconstructing the message and in which some shares are dropped randomly. In such cases we consider the protocol to decide beforehand which of the constructed shares will be dropped later and to declare one of the remaining shares the "main share". Broadcasting Messages. If the protocol chooses to copy or broadcast messages to several receivers, we consider the copy sent to the challenge receiver to be the main message and copies sent to other receivers to be noise (which, if the copies are created by nodes that are not users, will not count into the bandwidth overhead). 6 Private Information Retrieval. In schemes based on private information retrieval we require that the receiver retrieves the information sufficiently fast (within the latency limit). Otherwise, our method is similar to the broadcasting of messages: the receiver of interest will retrieve the main message, whereas other receivers will retrieve copies that are modeled as noise. Excluded Protocols. For this work we exclude protocols that cannot guarantee the delivery of a message within the given latency bound (except if this occurs with a negligible probability). Moreover, we cannot easily express the exploitation of side channels to transfer information, e.g., sending information about one message in the meta-data of another message, or sending bits of information by not sending a message.
C. Construction of a Concrete Adversary
Given two challenge users u 0 and u 1 and the set of observed tokens (t, r) ∈ Tokens, where t is the token and r the round in which the token was observed, an adversary can construct the sets S j (for j ∈ {0, 1}). Assume the challenge message arrives at the receiver R in a round r. We construct possible paths of varying length k, s.t., each element p ∈ S j represents a possible path of the challenge message starting from u j (j ∈ {0, 1}) and the challenge message then arrives at R in round r k = r. With challenge bit b, S b cannot be empty, as the actual path taken by the challenge message to reach R has to be one element in S b . A paths thus checks whether both challenge users could have sent the challenge message. We explicitly ignore differences in probabilities of the challenge users having sent the challenge message, as those probabilities can be protocol specific. Naturally, when c = 0, A paths represents a non-compromising adversary; but when c = 0, A paths is partially compromising.
D. Protocol Invariants
We now investigate the robustness of protocols against our adversary. We define an invariant that, if not satisfied, allows A paths to win against any protocol. Moreover, we present a protocol that maximizes the probability of fulfilling the invariant. Moreover, we show that whenever the invariant is fulfilled by our protocol, the advantage of A paths reduces to zero (as it is forced to randomly guess b). Necessary invariant for protocol anonymity. It is necessary that at least both challenge users send messages in one of the rounds before the challenge message reaches the recipient, as otherwise there is no way both of them could have sent the challenge message. Moreover, on the path of the actual challenge message, there needs to be at least one honest (uncompromised) party, as otherwise the adversary can track the challenge message from the sender to the recipient ( S b will have exactly one element and S 1−b will be empty). Those two conditions together form our necessary protocol invariant. We refer to Appendix B for the proof. We next claim that it suffices to consider noise messages sent by users that also remain within the system for at most rounds, i.e., noise messages that follow the same rules as real messages. Note that we consider every new message originating from any user's client as a fresh noise message.
Claim 2 (Internal noise does not influence Invariant 1). Any message not originating from an end user u ∈ S does not influence the probability for Invariant 1 being true. Moreover, noise messages do not contribute to the probability for Invariant 1 being true after they stayed in the network for rounds.
We refer to Appendix B for the proof. We henceforth consider noise messages as a protocol input.
E. Ideal Protocol
We construct a protocol Π ideal that maximizes the probability of fulfilling Invariant 1. We show that the invariant is sufficient for Π ideal to win against A paths , i.e., to reduce A paths 's advantage to 0. Claim 1 shows that for any protocol in our model A paths wins whenever Invariant 1 does not hold. Thus, an upper bound on the probability that Π ideal satisfies Invariant 1 yields an upper bound for all these protocols.
Given the set of all protocol parties P = {P 0 , . . . , P K−1 } of size K, the strategy of Π ideal is as follows: in a round r, Π ideal delivers all messages scheduled for delivery to a recipient. All other messages (including the messages that enter Π ideal in round r) are sent to the protocol party P i with i = r mod K. For every message that enters the protocol, Π ideal queries an oracle O for the number of rounds the message should remain in the protocol. We define the following events:
• u.sent(x, y) : user u has sent at least one message within rounds from x to y. For a single round we use u.sent(x).
• Cmpr(x) : A paths has compromised the next x consecutive parties on the path.
• ¬H : NOT of event H. Given a message sent at t 0 by sender x, and delivered to the recipient at (t 0 + t), we define P t for sender v ∈ S \ {x}:
When v = u 1−b , and the message is the challenge message, P t is the probability of fulfilling Invariant 1, for the strategy above. For each message, oracle O chooses an optimal t that maximizes the expectation of P t over all users. After the oracle has decided the latencies for all messages, it sets the time t for the messages from u 1−b to . Since the oracle uses the knowledge of u 1−b , Π ideal is slightly more powerful than protocols in M . Due to the over-approximation with this (not realizable) oracle, the resulting protocol is optimal w.r.t. Invariant 1 (Refer to Claim 3 and Claim 4). We refer to Appendix B for the proofs of Claim 3 and Claim 4.
V. SYNCHRONIZED USERS WITH NON-COMPROMISING ADVERSARIES
In real life, the user distribution is independent of the protocol. However, to make the user distribution protocolfriendly in our modeling we consider a globally controlled user distribution. For this scenario, we consider non-compromising passive adversaries that can observe all network traffic.
A. Lower Bound on Adversarial Advantage
Proof. By Claim 3 and Claim 4, we know that Π ideal is an optimal protocol against A paths ; and with c = 0, A paths is our representative non-compromising adversary. Thus, it suffices to calculate the advantage of A paths against Π ideal as a lower bound of the adversary's advantage against any protocol.
Let, u 0 and u 1 be the users chosen by the adversary and let b be the challenge bit. Let t 0 be the round in which u b sends the challenge message and let r be the round in which the challenge message reaches the recipient.
Recall that Invariant 1 is necessary for the protocol to provide anonymity; u 1−b sends her messages (can be a noise mes- Given any values , β ≥ 0 , A paths has the least chance of winning, if for a given interval of rounds, βN unique users are picked to send the noise messages in such a way that they are not scheduled to send their own messages in that interval.
Thus, we can bound the probability for the adversary as 
B. Impossibility for Strong Anonymity
We
1) If = N, we can have δ = 0 even for β = 0. Anonymity can be achieved trivially by accumulating all messages from all N users and delivering them together at round (N + 1). In this case 2 β = 0 < 1 − (η), but also βN = 0 < 1.
N . In rounds the protocol can send βN = N noise messages and achieve strong anonymity (all N users send a noise message each).
3) β = messages, and thus, with high probability u 1−b does not send a message. Hence, Π ideal cannot achieve strong anonymity.
VI. SYNCHRONIZED USERS WITH PARTIALLY COMPROMISING ADVERSARIES
We now extend our analysis of the previous section by having compromised protocol parties. Given the set of protocol parties P, now our adversary A paths can compromise a set of c parties P c ⊂ P. If A paths can compromise all the parties in P, anonymity is broken trivially -that's why we do not analyze that case separately. Recall from Section IV-C that A paths picks the c parties from P uniformly at random. We consider the same user distribution U B as in Section V.
A. Lower Bound on Adversarial Advantage
Theorem 3. For user distribution U B , no protocol Π ∈ M can provide δ-sender anonymity, for any
Case c ≥ :
Arriving messages satisfy Invariant 1 depending on Pc.
Arriving messages don't satisfy Invariant 1. Proof. Let u 0 , u 1 be the challenge users and let b be the challenge bit. Moreover, let t 0 be the time the challenge message is sent by u b and let r = t 0 + t be the time it is received by the recipient, where t is the delivery time decided by the oracle O. Similar to Section V, we now calculate the advantage of A paths against Π ideal . We distinguish two cases, depending on and c: 1) First, where the number of compromised parties c is at least as large as the maximal latency . In this case, all parties on the path of the challenge message could be compromised. 2) Second, where not all parties on the path of the challenge message can be compromised. And hence, the analysis focuses on the arrival times of messages from u 1−b . For a graphical depiction of the relationship between the rounds a message from u 1−b arrives and it satisfying Invariant 1 we refer to Figure 5 .
1) Case c ≥ . We know, ≥ t holds by definition. The invariant is true only if u 1−b sends at least one message in one of the rounds between (r − ) and (r − 1). Additionally, if u 1−b sends at least one message in {r− , . . . , t 0 }, the invariant holds only if there is at least one non-compromised party on the path between t 0 and (r − 1). Whereas, if u 1−b does not send any message in {r − , . . . , t 0 }, and the first message from u 1−b in the interval {t 0 + 1, r − 1} arrives at t 1 , the invariant holds only if there is at least one non-compromised party on the path between t 1 and (r − 1).
Note that K > c ≥ . Also recall from Section IV that A paths picks the c parties uniformly at random from K parties. Hence,
By Claim 1 the adversary wins whenever Invariant 1 is not true, and by Claim 4 A paths has zero advantage whenever Π ideal satisfies the invariant. Hence, we know that the probability that the adversary guesses incorrectly is bounded by:
The probability that all parties on the mutual path of the challenge message and a message from the alternative sender u 1−b are compromised now mainly depends on the arrival time of the messages from u 1−b . We find two sub-cases depending on the oracle's choice for t. 2a) Case c ≤ t:
Note that the probability that there are no messages from The above calculations are done considering that best scenario. Also note that the value of K may be larger or smaller than and t, but as long as c ≤ K, the bound given above holds. Hence,
2b) Case t < c :
The event expression above is the same as in the previous case (t > c). The bound on δ thus follows analogously.
B. Impossibility for Strong Anonymity
We refer to Appendix B for the proof. To achieve strong anonymity against A paths , we need ∈ ω(1), additional to the constraint of 2 β > 1−neg(η). We now focus on the constraint ∈ ω(1) and refer to Section V-B for a comprehensive case study on the other constraint. Interesting Cases. Now we are going to discuss a few interesting cases for different values of < c, and K.
1)
= η and K /c = constant: In this case we have,
becomes negligible and strong anonymity is possible. Even though c has a high value, because of the high value of it is highly likely that the challenge message will meet a message from u 1−b at some honest node, given a high value of β such that 2 β > 1 − neg(η). K is also non-negligible. Even though c has a small value, is also small. Hence, it is unlikely that the challenge message will mix with a message from u 1−b at some honest node. Thus, strong anonymity cannot be achieved.
We refer to Appendix B for the proof. The analysis in this case is exactly same as Section V-B, except that here we need to consider the slice of ( − c) rounds instead of rounds.
It is worth repeating here, all the constraints we have derived in Section V and Section VI are necessary for anonymity, but they are not sufficient conditions for anonymity.
VII. UNSYNCHRONIZED USERS WITH NON-COMPROMISING ADVERSARIES
In this and the subsequent section we use an unsynchronised user distribution U P : In each round, independent of other users and other rounds, each client tosses a biased coin with success probability p ∈ (0, 1]. On a success the client sends a message in that round, otherwise it does not send a message. Consequently, the number of messages per round follows Binomial distribution Binom(N, p) if the number of users N is large and p sufficiently small, the resulting binomial distribution reduces to a Poisson distribution, which is a close approximation of real-life traffic patterns.
For a protocol with bandwidth overhead β, we distinguish between the actual probability that users want to send messages p and the value for p that we use in our analysis, i.e., we set p = p + β. In this unsynchronised scenario the bandwidth of genuine messages contributes to the anonymity bound. As in Section V we consider a non-compromising adversary.
A. Lower Bound on Adversarial Advantage
Theorem 6. For user distribution U P , no protocol Π ∈ M can provide δ-sender anonymity, for any δ < 1 −
Proof. Since we consider a non-compromising adversary, 
(i) be a random variable representing the number of users that send messages in an interval of rounds. We calculate for the expected value E[X] of X,
Using the Chernoff Bound on the random variable X we derive
For brevity in the following calculation we denote, P r [X ≥ 2μ] by E and the event that T is non-empty by Y and since all users are acting independently from each other we get for j ∈ {0, . . . , N},
If 2μ > N, we get with f ( ) = min
)) . We now use Markov's Inequality on X and derive
Note that in the proof of Theorem 6, in case p is a constant and N is a very high value, then E goes towards zero and instead of using Markov's inequality, we can derive δ ≥ 1 − 2f p ( ).
B. Impossibility for Strong Anonymity
Theorem 7. For user distribution U P and p > 0, no protocol Π ∈ M can achieve strong anonymity if 2 p < 1 − (η), where
We refer to Appendix B for the proof. Similar to the constraints in Section V and Section VI, this is also a necessary constraint for anonymity, not a sufficient condition. There can exist and p such that 2 p > 1 − neg(η), but still no protocol can achieve strong anonymity. Interesting Cases. Now we are going to discuss a few interesting cases for different values of , p, and N.
Since p = 1, in rounds the protocol has 1 message per user on an average. So, the protocol has a high chance of winning. Whereas in Section V-B, we saw that Π ideal can win with absolute certainty in this case.
2) p = rounds, and hence the protocol has a small chance to win. As in Section V-B, Π ideal can not achieve strong anonymity in this case, since the necessary constraints are not satisfied.
VIII. UNSYNCHRONIZED USERS WITH PARTIALLY COMPROMISING ADVERSARIES
Finally, we consider partially compromising adversaries that can compromise a set of c parties P c ⊂ P for the user distribution U P defined in Section VII.
A. Lower Bound on Adversarial Advantage
Theorem 8. For user distribution U P , no protocol Π ∈ M can provide δ-sender anonymity, for any
We derive the bound in Theorem 8 by combining the techniques presented in Section VI and Section VII. Since the proof does not introduce novel techniques, we omit it and instead refer the interested reader to Appendix B for the proof.
B. Impossibility for Strong Anonymity
To analyze the negligibility condition of δ in this scenario, we heavily borrow the analyses that we already have conducted in Section VII-B and Section VI-B. We are going to analyze this scenario in two parts:
+ fp( ) . To make δ negligible, both the factors [ overwhelming. This is a necessary condition, but not sufficient. For a detailed discussion, we refer to Section VI-B. From Section VII-B we know that the necessary condition for [ 1 /2 + fp( )] to be overwhelming is 2 p > 1 − neg(η). Hence, both conditions are necessary to achieve strong anonymity. Case c < : We have,
In the above expression, we can see two factors:
To make δ negligible, it suffices that F 1 or F 2 become negligible. Unlike Section VI, here f p ( − c) and f p (c) are independent, which allows us to analyze F 1 and F 2 independently. First, F 1 is similar to the δ-bound in Section VII, except that we consider f p ( − c) instead of f p ( ). Hence, the analysis of F 1 is analogous to Section VII-B. Second, F 2 is negligible if both [ can not be overwhelming for a constant c. Moreover, f p (c) can be analyzed exactly as f p ( ) in Section VII-B.
IX. RECIPIENT ANONYMITY We derive impossibility results for recipient anonymity analogous to our results for sender anonymity via the same strategy we employed in the previous sections. In this case, since we are considering recipient anonymity, we assume only one sender in S, and N users in R. Here, the adversary is naturally not informed about the delivery of the challenge message by a recipient, but of the sending of the challenge message by the sender. Moreover, instead of ignoring all internally generated messages in Claim 2 we ignore all internally terminating messages. Note that this gives β a slightly different flavor. Synchronized Users. We slightly tweak the user distribution to suit the definition of recipient anonymity. We assume that all the input messages come within N rounds, exactly one message per round, following a random permutation that assigns one round to each recipient. In a given round, the sender sends a message to the assigned recipient. Then, the protocol decides when to deliver the message to the recipient, but not delaying more than rounds. Let f RA β (x) = min 1,
. Then we get that no protocol Π ∈ M can provide δ-recipient anonymity in the following cases:
• Without compromisation:
• For adversaries that compromise up to c parties:
Moreover, no protocol M with K ∈ poly(η) can achieve strong recipient anonymity when < N and βN ≥ 1 in the following cases, where (η) is a non-negligible function.
• Without compromisation: if 4 β < 1 − (η),
Unsynchronized Users. Similar to the previous case, here also we borrow the definition of user distribution from Section VII, with minor modifications. The biased coins are now associated with recipients instead of senders -in each round the sender sends a message for a recipient, with probability
Moreover, for p > 0, no protocol can achieve strong recipient anonymity if 2 p < 1 − (η), where (η) is a non-negligible function. For a detailed recipient-anonymity analysis, we refer the readers to the extended version [33] .
X. IMPLICATIONS To put our result into perspective, we discuss whether our trilemma excludes strong anonymity for a few AC protocols from the literature. More precisely, this section exemplarily applies the results from Theorem 2 and Theorem 7, i.e., with synchronized and unsynchronized user distributions and a global network-level, non-compromising adversary. We use both results since for some AC protocols (e.g., DC-nets [15] ) the synchronized user distribution is more accurate and for other protocols (e.g., Tor [10] ) the unsynchronized user distribution is more accurate. Our constraints mark an area on a 2D graph (see Figure 6 ) with latency overhead (x-axis) versus bandwidth overhead (y-axis) where strong anonymity is impossible. As the latency of some AC protocols depends on system parameters and we want to place the protocols in a 2D graph, we carefully choose system parameters and make a few simplifying assumptions, which are subsequently described.
This section is solely intended to put our impossibility result into perspective. It is not meant and not qualified to be a performance and scalability comparison of the discussed AC protocols. Table I in the appendix summarizes bounds on the bandwidth β and latency overhead (in the sense of this work).
Technically, this section considers translations of AC protocols into our protocol model. As these translations do not provide any additional insights, we do not present the full translated protocols but only the abstraction steps. We abstract away the cryptographic instantiation of messages including the bandwidth overhead they introduce over the plaintext. We assume an upper bound on the latency of the protocol and are oblivious to server-side noise (see Claim 2) . Moreover, recall that we are only interested in the question whether our trilemma excludes strong anonymity for the ten AC protocols from the literature; hence, we consider the upper bound on the latency and bandwidth overhead for deterministic latency. For randomized latency, such as Loopix [24] , we list for simplicity the expected delay as the latency bound.
Low-latency protocols such as Tor [10] , Hornet [49] , and Herd [25] are low-latency AC protocols, i.e., they immediately forward messages. While Tor and Hornet do not produce asymptotically more than a constant amount of both bandwidth overhead and latency overhead and thus cannot provide strong anonymity, Herd produces dummy traffic linearly proportional to the number of users (bandwidth overhead β ∈ θ(N/N)), thus the trilemma does not exclude strong anonymity for Herd.
Riposte [50] uses secure multiparty computation and a variant of PIR to implement an anonymous bulletin board. Riposte operates in epochs and for each epoch the set of users is public. Hence, Riposte is expected to be run with long epochs to maximize the number of users that participate in an epoch, which leads us to estimating the latency overhead to be ∈ θ(N ). To counter traffic analysis attacks, Riposte clients send constant dummy traffic, resulting in a bandwidth overhead of β ∈ θ(N/N). Thus, the trilemma does not exclude strong anonymity for Riposte.
Vuvuzela [20] is a mix-net that is tailored towards messengers. Clients communicate by deposing their encrypted messages in one of the mix net nodes. To achieve strong resistance against compromised servers, Vuvuzela takes a path through all servers, resulting in a latency overhead of ∈ θ(K) . Asymptotic latency overhead ( ) and bandwidth overhead (β) together with the "area of impossibility" where 2 β ≤ 1 − (η). We portray protocols as dots depending on their choices for and β. Technically, if we use Theorem 7, we β is replaced by p = β+p , where p is the rate at which users send messages. This graph assumes N is ca. poly(η), the number of nodes K is ca. log η. The threshold for Threshold Mix T = 1 and for Threshold Mixsec T = N = poly(η). In the graph, both the axes are approximately in logarithmic scale. (For a more accurate visual representation we refer the readers to Appendix C and [51].) (for K servers). Additionally, Vuvuzela utilizes constant traffic, leading to a bandwidth overhead of β ∈ θ(N/N), and has the potential for strong anonymity.
Riffle [21] uses a verifiable mix-net. Just as Vuvuzela, Riffle also chooses paths that traverse all K servers, leading to ∈ θ(K) and if we assume K ∈ θ(log(η)), we get ∈ θ(log(η)). We assume that the clients send dummy traffic up to a constant rate (depending on the user's sending rate p ), so we have β ∈ θ(N/N) and the potential for strong anonymity.
In a threshold mix net, each of the K mix servers waits until it received up to a threshold T many messages before relaying the messages to the next mix, resulting in ∈ θ(T × K). Threshold mixes [14] do not provide strong anonymity unless their threshold T is of the order of the number of users N . As such a large threshold are impractical for a large number of users, we judge it impossible to achieve strong anonymity for practical of Threshold mixes.
Loopix [24] is a mix net that combines exponentially distributed delays at each mix-node and dummy messages from each user. Ignoring so-called loop messages (meant to counter active attacks), Loopix naturally enforces our unsynchronised user distribution: the rate at which Loopix clients send messages is the sum of a dummy-message rate (β) and a payload message rate (p ), which are system parameters. We assume that the path lengths in Loopix' stratified topology is √ K with the number of nodes K ∈ θ(log(η)).
and if every hop introduces an expected delay of ≥
and the trilemma does not exclude strong anonymity for Loopix.
In AC protocols based on DC-nets [15] , [18] each party broadcasts either a dummy or real message in every round to every other party. As our bandwidth overhead only counts dummy-message rates, it does not capture the broadcast, thus β ∈ θ(N/N). DC-nets use a combination operation (e.g., an XOR) that causes dummy messages to cancel out. Then, all parties output the resulting bitstring. If only one real message is sent, the bitstring equals this message. As Theorem 7 assumes a synchronized user distribution, in each round only one party sends a message, thus our model treats as ∈ θ (1) .
The Dissent-AT [22] scheme (the AnyTrust-variant of Dissent) improves on the performance of DC-nets by relying on dedicated servers. Instead of broadcasting to every other client, clients in Dissent-AT send these messages to at least one of these dedicated servers. These servers then perform a DC-net communication round. Abstracting from an initial setup phase and only counting the client-messages, Dissent-AT has β ∈ θ(N/N) for the clients (assuming that each client communicates to one server), and ∈ θ(1).
Dicemix [16] is a peer-to-peer AC protocol that is based on the DC-net approach. While Dicemix includes a self-healing mechanism that leads to 4 + 2f communication rounds for one message if f peers are malicious, this mechanism does not kick in if all peers are honest, leading to only 4 communication rounds, resutling in ∈ θ(1). As every party sends a message in every round β ∈ θ(N/N).
XI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper proves the anonymity trilemma: strong anonymity, low bandwidth, low latency-choose two! We derive necessary constraints for sender anonymity and recipient anonymity, and thereby presents necessary constraints that are crucial for understanding bi-directional anonymous communication: sender anonymity for hiding the sender and recipient anonymity for hiding the recipient of a message.
For future work, we plan to extend the work in four natural directions: (i) derive tighter bounds by using more sophisticated attackers, (ii) derive bounds for other anonymity notions (e.g., unlinkability and relationship anonymity), (iii) extend the protocol mode with a notion of a throughput limitation, (iv) relax the requirement that messages are sent with certainty and allow for unreliable channels. For example, for the first direction, we plan to take the same steps as outlined in Section II-B, i.e., to formulate an invariant, to construct a protocol optimal w.r.t. this invariant, and then to compute the advantage of the more sophisticated attacker against this protocol. Protocol Latency Bandwidth Strong Anonymity Tor [10] θ (1) θ(1/N) impossible Hornet [49] θ (1) θ(1/N) impossible Herd [25] θ (1) [15] , [18] θ (1) θ(N/N) possible Dissent-AT [22] θ (1) θ(N/N) possible DiceMix [16] θ ( Proof. Let Π be a protocol ∈ M with K parties with parameters β and . Part (2) of the Lemma holds, since we restrict the user distributions accordingly and since the none of the transitions in the petri-net can create more tokens within the network than it consumes from its input place.
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)
We show the part (1) of the lemma via structural induction over fired transitions of the petri net. We additionally add to the induction invariant that all tokens that are not in S have a timestamp for their next transition of ts = 1 and a remaining time of t r > 0 and there are at least t r rounds left in which the token can be delivered.
Induction base: The protocol is initialized and no transitions have happened. Thus, no messages have been sent so far, i.e., there is no message that has not been delivered within steps. The only transition that can fire is T S and for > 0, the message introduced into the network in this way does not need to be delivered already (0 < t r = ). Moreover, T S sets the timestamp of this message token to ts = 1 Induction step: Let tr be any execution trace s.t. the induction invariant is satisfied and let t be an arbitrary possible transition that extends tr to tr :: t.
We distinguish two cases for t: In case t is T S , it consumes a token from P S and puts this token into a place P i and, by definition we have t r > 0 and ts = 1. Otherwise, the transition is T Pi for some i and consumes a token from P i accordingly. By the induction invariant, the token has t r > 0. If this token has t r −1 = 0, the transition delivers the token to R. Otherwise, t decreases t r by one (thus fulfilling the condition that there are at least t r rounds left in which the token can be delivered) and sets ts = 1. Since every token in any place P i needs to be consumed in every round, the protocol delivers every message in at most steps.
Other parts of the lemma: By definition of our petri net, whenever a transition fires, an element (t, r) is placed into Tokens, containing the public fields of t, such as t.prev and t.next, as well as the current round number r, which fulfills part (3). Moreover, whenever the transition places the token in R, the adversary can additionally see the field t.msg and no transition can change the field msg, which allows the adversary to effectively tag and recognize the challenge message and thus fulfills part (4). Finally, if any party P i is compromised, P i does not modify the unique (and otherwise freshly sampled) field t.ID t , which allows the adversary to map incoming and outgoing messages.
Since the transitions discussed here are the only way for messages to be sent to a recipient, the model correctly enforces the conditions from the lemma.
B. Expressing Protocols in the petri net model
Modeling DC net. Here we show how to model an actual DC net type protocol using our petri net model M as defined in Section IV. Specifically we pick up the short DC net protocol proposed by Golle and Juels [18] , and present M DC which models the aforementioned protocol.
We model a DC net protocol with N participants, where S = P, |S| = |P| = N. We denote the parties with P 1 , . . . , P N . The protocol can be denoted by Π DC ={paramgen, keydist, post, verify, extract} 7 -as described below.
• paramgen: In prot DC , paramgen is executed by a trusted entity and the output is published. Since we are mainly interested in the anonymity game, we consider that paramgen step is executed by our honest challenger and happens outside the protocol run, and the output is globally known (to all the transitions T Pi ).
• keydist: using the output of paramgen, this step yields for each party P i a private key x i and a corresponding public key y i . In prot DC , the above key generation part is done by a trusted entity, and hence we consider that it is done by our honest challenger and for each party P i the public-private keypair x i , y i is already known to the corresponding transition function T Pi . As part of protocol each party P i publishes its public key y i . Additionally, each party P j receives from P i a share of private key x i,j and a share of public key y i,j , where the keys are shared in a (k, N) threshold manner for a parameter k ≤ N.
• post: Each player P i generates a vector of random pads
8 using x i . Π DC does not handle collisions, instead assumes that the players decide their positions by a consensus protocol. Similarly our model assumes that each party P i knows its position, and assume the position is q i (but not known to the adversary). Then each player P i computes the vector V i such that V i (w) = W i (w) for all w = i and V i (w) = W i (w) ⊕ m i for w = q i , where m i is the message of P i . Also, each player P i computes σ i = {σ i (1), σ i (2), . . . , σ i (N)}, where σ i includes the identity of player P i and a proof of valid formatting of V i . Then P i publishes both the vectors V i and σ i . Our model assumes the pair (V i (w), σ i (w)) for each position w as a single message, where V i (w) is a message content and σ i (w) becomes a part of meta field. For each position w player P i generates one such message, and publishes the message to all other players.
• verify and extract are local computations after a party P i receives messages from all other parties.
Although the protocol model assumes that the adversary can not read the contents of any message, here we shall model Π DC along with its cryptographic primitives to demonstrate the expressiveness of our model. Alternatively, to get rid of all the cryptographic primitives, the parties can send a dummy message (= 0) whenever V i (w) = W i (w), and the actual message m i whenever V i (w) = W i (w).
As per our anonymity definition in Section III, we assume that up to (N−2) users can be compromised, which necessarily makes up to (N − 2) protocol parties compromised. The adversary chooses two challenge users, and one of them sends the challenge message depending on the challenge bit b. All other (N − 1) users send dummy messages.
In M DC we model Π DC as a two round protocol. The challenger sets the initial configuration of the petri-net with the messages to be sent by each party. In the first round, each party P i sends two kinds messages: (1) publishes the public key message y i and (2) sends share of the public-private keypair (x i,j , y i,j ) to P j for all j = i. Here, one party can publish a message to (N − 1) other parties by sending (N − 1) separate messages. In the second round, each party P i publishes N messages: one message for each position, only one of them contains his own message. After second round, every party receives messages from every other party, and then does local computations to verify and extract the original messages.
For Π DC , we do not actually need a separate recipient R in Π DC , if we make R = P. But, to be consistent with M , in M DC we keep a separate recipient. In the second round whenever a party P i publishes a message, P i also sends a copy to R. This easily models the fact that the adversary knows whenever a message is published, but avoids the complication of modeling a subset of compromised recipients.
The meta fields of the tokens contains the following subfields: (1) stage, (2) position, (3) sigma. stage can have three possible values identifying three possible cases: (1) public key distribution, (2) share of the public-private keypair, (3) message. Using stage subfield, any party in the protocol recognizes if the message is part of keydist messages, or part of post messages. When the value of stage is message, the user posts V i (w), and position takes the value of w. sigma includes the identity of the sender and a proof of computation whenever necessary. sigma fields helps in the verify stage, we avoid the details here.
If we want to analyze the user distribution for Π DC , we do not count the first round since it is used only for key exchange. Note that, if we get rid of the cryptographic primitives, we do not require the first round. Modeling Tor. Since Tor does not operate in rounds, embedding it into our model is not straight forward. Suppose, a Tor node takes at least x milliseconds to process a message when it receives a message, and it takes at least y milliseconds for a message to travel from one node to the next node over a network link. Then we define one round as x+y milliseconds. We assume a perfect condition where each node takes exactly equal computation time for one message, and each link has exactly same delay. In the real world, delays and computation times are less stable, but can be estimated by an adversary. Instead of analyzing this, we instead allow the messages to remain within the node for the respective time.
Tor nodes and recipients are separate entities and hence, S, P and R are mutually exclusive. Whenever a Tor node receives a message, the node immediately processes and forwards that message to the next node or recipient. We can either model the latency overhead of Tor by estimating the time messages spend within the network that exceeds the (minimal) round length x+y from above, or we set it to the number of hops, i.e., = 3. In either case, we assume that does not increase with η and thus get a latency overhead ∈ O(1). For analyzing Tor with a variable number h of hops, we can instead set = h. When a party P i receives a message, T Pi can retrieve the next hop from the meta field of the message. Since Tor does not add any noise messages, the bandwidth overhead is β = 0.
APPENDIX B DELAYED PROOFS
Proof of Claim 1. If the set T is empty, then S 1−b is empty as well. However, by construction of our protocol mode, the set S b is always non-empty. Consequently, the adversary A paths will output b and thus win with probability 1. If T is not empty, the following cases can occur:
1) The challenge message never passes through an honest node: In this case, the field ID t of the message never changes for the tokens. Thus, S b will have exactly one element, and S 1−b will be an empty set, and consequently A paths wins.
2) The challenge message passes through one or more honest nodes at times t , such that t < min(T ), but not afterwards. Following the same reasoning as above, we see that paths before min(T ) can be ambiguous, but none of them leads to u 1−b . Hence, S b can have multiple elements, but S 1−b will still be an empty set. Thus, A paths wins.
3) The challenge message passes through an honest node at time t with t ≥ min(T ). In this case, the invariant is true.
In all of the above mentioned cases either the invariant is true, or the adversary wins with probability 1.
Proof of Claim 2. Let u 0 , u 1 be the challenge users and let b be the challenge bit and let r be the round in which the challenge message is delivered to the recipient. We discuss both parts of the invariant separately:
(i) The set T is not empty. Since by definition, T is the set of messages sent by u 1−b , messages originating in any party not in S do not influence T . Moreover, any message sent by u 1−b in a round previous to r − does not influence T either. Thus, noise messages staying in the protocol for more than rounds, do not improve the probability of T being not empty.
(ii) The challenge message passes through at least one honest node at some time t such that, t ∈ {min(T ), . . . , r − 1}. Obviously this second part of the invariant does not depend on any noise message.
Proof of Claim 3. We want to prove our claim by contradiction. Suppose, Π ideal is not the best protocol. That means, there exists a protocol Π new , which satisfies Invariant 1 with a higher probability than Π ideal , against the adversary A paths . Now we construct a new protocol Π hybrid , which exactly follows the strategy of Π ideal with one exception: for a given message Π hybrid selects the time delay t same as Π new , instead of querying it from oracle O. Suppose, the challenge message is delivered to the recipient at round r. Given the set {min(T ), . . . , r − 1}, the ideal strategy for ensuring that at least one honest party is on the path of the challenge message is to ensure that as many distinct parties as possible are on this path. Also, given the time delay t, the value of min(T ) is independent of the protocol, since protocols in M are oblivious to the challenge users and the challenge message. Hence, Π hybrid has a probability of satisfying Invariant 1 at least as high as Π new . Now, if we compare Π hybrid and Π ideal : they follow the same strategy. But Π ideal picks the time delay t for any message from oracle O (except for messages from u 1−b ) such that t is optimal. The time delay t can be picked for each message independent of the time delays of other messages. Hence, the value of t received from oracle O for the challenge message is optimal. Hence, Π ideal satisfies Invariant 1 with probability at least as high as Π hybrid . Thus, Π new does not satisfy Invariant 1 with a higher probability than Π ideal .
Proof of Claim 4.
If the Invariant is true, the challenge message passes through an honest party at t , such that t > min(T ). Hence, there is at least one message (noise or original message) from u 1−i which visits the same honest party together with the challenge message (Π ideal ensures that all messages are always kept together until they are delivered).
That ensures that in addition to S b = ∅, we also have S 1−b = ∅ and thus A paths outputs a random bit (and has an advantage of zero).
Proof of Theorem 2. For strong anonymity, we require: δ(η) = neg(η), and we know that for Π ideal we have:
We assume for contradiction that there is a protocol limited by and β such that 2 β < 1 − (η) that still achieves strong anonymity. Since δ(η) = neg(η), we know that (η) > δ(η).
The above contradicts the assumption that 2 β < 1 − (η). Note: In case βN < 1, no noise messages are allowed per round (i.e., β = 0) and thus δ(η) ≥ 1 − /N, which is not negligible unless = N, since N = poly(η).
Proof of Theorem 4. When c > : 
For any ∈ O(1), (1/η x ) is non-negligible.
Proof of Theorem 5. When c < : Thus, when 2μ ≤ N, a necessary condition for δ to become negligible is 2 p > 1 − neg(η).
When 2μ > N, using μ = N(1 − (1 − p) ) we get:
Proof of Theorem 8. Let X (i) (x) and X(x) be defined as in the proof for Theorem 6, where we replace the fixed length of the slice by a variable x. Using the Chernoff Bound on the random variable X(x) calculate Pr [X(x) − μ(x) ≥ Na] ≤ exp(−2a 2 N), and for a =
μ(x)
N , we define E(x) as :
Note that, similar to X (i) (x) and X(x), μ(x) is also defined as in the proof for Theorem 6, but for a slice of variable length x. We denote the event that sender x :
Now, we calculate the probability of Invariant 1 being true, under our protocol Π ideal and as in the proof for Theorem 3. We distinguish two cases depending on c and : The above event expression is exactly same as the expression we had in the previous case (t > c). Thus, the rest of the calculations and bounds are exactly same as the previous case.
APPENDIX C VISUAL 3D REPRESENTATIONS OF THE RESULTS
In the paper, we focus on lower-bound results for strong anonymity (or negligible δ values). However, our key Theorems 1, 3, 6 and 8 also offer lower bounds for non-negligilable δ values, which can be of interest to several AC protocols.
On our project webpage [51], we visualize these lower bounds using interactive 3D surface plots. In particular, we plot the adversarial advantage δ ∈ [0, 1] as a function of β and . We encourage the readers to interact with these plots to better understand our results for non-negligilbe δ values.
Here, in Figures 7 to 10 , we present and analyze four snapshots of those lower bound plots for the number of users N = 10000. The x-axis represents latency (ranging from 0 to 200), and the y-axis bandwidth overhead β (ranging from 0.0 to 0.04). But in Figure 9 and Figure 10 , the y-axis actually represents total bandwidth p = p + β as in Theorem 7. A derived δ lower bound for the non-compromising adversary is also a valid lower bound for a (partially) compromising adversary. For some edge cases (e.g., when is close to N and β is close to 0), due to some approximations employed in the compromising adversaries scenario, the non-compromising adversary lower bound is actually tighter than the compromising adversaries lower bound. Therefore, in Figure 10 , while plotting the 3D graph for a partially compromising adversary scenario, we have used the maximum of the lower bounds on δ for compromising adversary and non-compromising adversary.
In each plot, the dark blue region indicates the possibility of obtaining strong anonymity. For any point (x, y) outside those regions, strong anonymity is not possible. For example, as shown in Figure 7 , for = 100 the bandwidth overhead β has to be at least 0.01 to expect strong anonymity.
For the chosen c and K, the plots in Figures 7 and 8 are almost identical as the and β factors contribute more to anonymity than the compromised parties can affect it. If we instead compare Figure 9 with Figure 10 , the effect of compromisation is noticeable: the dark blue region in Figure 10 is much smaller than that in Figure 9 . Also, we can see a steep wall in Figure 10 for ≤ c = 20, demonstrating that providing anonymity becomes difficult when < c; however, for > c, the effect of compromisation is less noticeable.
